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Abstract
We study a surveillance wireless sensor network (SWSN) comprised of small and
low-cost sensors deployed in a region in order to detect objects crossing the field
of interest. In the present paper, we address two problems concerning the design
and performance of an SWSN: optimal sensor placement and algorithms for object
detection in the presence of false alarms. For both problems, we propose explicit
decision rules and efficient algorithmic solutions. Further, we provide several numerical
examples and present a simulation model that combines our placement and detection
methods.
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1 Introduction
An important class of wireless sensor networks (WSN) is the WSNs comprised of small
and low-cost sensors with limited computational and communication power [1]. Sensors
are deployed in a region, they wake up, organize themselves as a network, and start sensing
the area. The objective of the sensors is sensing the environment and communicating the
information to a data collection center. Many types of employment are envisaged for WSNs
ranging from the monitoring of endangered animal populations to military surveillance
or the surveillance of critical infrastructures [12], archeological sites [2], perimeters, or
country borders [10]. The tasks of a surveillance wireless sensor network (SWSN) is to
detect objects crossing the field of interest. The sensors monitor the environment and send
reports to a central control unit. The major requirement of a surveillance application is
that the SWSN is to monitor the environment with a certain quality for a specific period
of time. Important issues in designing an SWSN are the deployment decisions such as the
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sensing range of sensor nodes and density of the SWSN, and deployment strategy (random,
regular, planned, etc.) to be applied [10].
Different types of sensors may have to be utilized in a WSN to address the problem
at hand. For outdoor surveillance systems, radar, microwave, ultrasonic and/or infrared
sensors are typical. To analyze the detection performance of the sensors or the surveillance
systems, a common measure such as the single-sensor detection probability p may be
utilized since it allows to abstract the different working principles of the sensors. The
factors that affect p are the object-to-sensor distance, environmental characteristics, the
size and the motion pattern of the object, etc. Moreover, He et al. [7, 8] showed that
sensors produce a non-negligible amount of false alarms. The false alarms are defined as
positive reports of a sensor when no object exists. Each sensor may produce a false alarm
with a certain probability q. If data/decision fusion [5] is allowed, then the false alarm
probability q negatively affects the detection performance of the network. The cost of false
alarms varies depending on the application. For example, it is lower in a home surveillance
system when compared to the cost of false alarms in a surveillance application of mission-
critical infrastructure such as a nuclear reactor. Hence, the objective of an upstanding
SWSN design is to maximize the detection probability of the system while minimizing
or bounding the false alarm rate of the system. To this end, in the present paper, we
study two problems concerning the design and performance of an SWSN: optimal sensor
placement and algorithms for intruder detection in the presence of false alarms. Our main
performance characteristics of the SWSN are the system’s intruder detection probability
and false alarm probability, for given input parameters p and q representing single-sensor
probabilities. The problem of correctly communicating the reports of the sensors to the
central control unit (with possibly additional failure probabilities) is beyond the scope of
the present study. It has been studied elsewhere, among others in a previous study group
Mathematics with Industry [9]. Therefore, we will assume perfect communication of the
reports.
The sensor placement problem addressed in this work is formulated as follows: given
a limited number of homogeneous sensors with an effective sensing range r and a field
of interest modelled as a one- or two-dimensional area, determine the optimal location of
the sensors that maximizes the detection performance of the SWSN. In Section 2.1, we
study the trade-off involved in overlapping sensor ranges. If the number of sensors is limited
then, clearly, overlaps decrease the total sensing part of the area but increase the detection
performance in the overlap of two or more sensor ranges. We give an explicit condition
when overlap in sensor ranges leads to better detection performance of the system. Next,
in Section 2.2 we propose an algorithm for efficient coverage of a 2-D area, based on a priori
knowledge on the probability distribution of the intruder position. When the distribution
of an object’s location in the area is uniform, our algorithm performs closely to the optimal
hexagonal placement.
Given a particular layout of the sensors, the probability of intruder detection and
the false alarm probability of the network depend on the decision rule that prescribes in
which situation an intrusion alarm has to be reported, based on observations from all
deployed sensors. For instance, if we have two completely overlapping sensors and report
an intrusion alarm only if both sensors signal an intruder, then the intruder detection
probability of the SWSN is p2 and the false alarm probability is q2. The problem is
to determine a decision rule for reporting an intrusion alarm such that the detection
performance of the network is maximized. In Section 3 we attempt to resolve this problem
by statistical methods. Our main conclusion is that several observations of the same
object are absolutely necessary to report an intrusion alarm with a reasonable confidence.
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However, multiple observations will result in a huge variety of observed patterns. Which
patterns signal the intruder and which are caused by false alarms only? This question is
tackled in Section 4 where we design a procedure for intruder detection, based on hidden
Markov models and the Viterbi algorithm.
Finally, in Section 5 we present a simulation model that combines our placement and
detection methods. Using this model, we characterize the detection performance in several
configurations of a detection area.
Throughout the paper, we use the following notations:
• p – single-sensor detection probability, the probability that a sensor signals an object
given that the object is present in the sensing range (assumed to be a circle, or
sphere);
• q – the single-sensor false alarm probability, the probability that a sensor signals an
intruder given that there is no intruder in the sensing range;
• r – sensing radius of a sensor;
Further, a random variable X ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator of the event that an object is
present in the sensing range of a sensor, and a random variable Y ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator
of the event that a sensor gives an alarm. We will also assume that the alarm events of
individual sensors are mutually independent when conditioned on the absence or presence
of the object.
2 Optimal coverage of the area
In this section we study the problem of optimal sensor placement, or sensor deployment,
formulated as follows. Consider an area where a number of sensors are to be deployed,
and assume that there is an object in the area. We define as pdetection the probability that
at least one sensor correctly detects the object. The goal is to find a sensor deployment
maximizing pdetection. In order to compute pdetection, throughout the section we assume an
a priori statistical knowledge on the object position.
One natural solution to this problem is to maximize the coverage of the observed area
for a given number of sensors, or, equivalently, minimize the number of sensors employed
while covering the complete area. If each sensor has a range with radius r, then we model
the sensing area as a circle of radius r with a center at the sensor location. Thus, the
question of minimizing the number of sensors while covering the complete area is equivalent
to the so-called covering problem in two dimensions: cover a given area completely with
the least amount of circles with a given fixed radius. This problem (and many others like
the packing and kissing problems) is solved by using the hexagonal lattice, defined as the
set of points λv + µw, λ, µ ∈ Z, where v = (1, 0) and w = (1/2,√3/2) are the vectors
spanning the lattice. To cover an area with circles of radius r, the vectors v, w must be
scaled by a factor r
√
3. In the asymptotic limit, with a large area covered by sensors and
with negligible boundary effects, the sum of the sensor ranges is 1.209 times the covered
area, meaning that about 20.9% of the area is covered by two sensors and the remainder
by one sensor. For further details, see [4]. An example of 7 sensors placed by using the
hexagonal lattice and completely covering a rectangular area is given in Figure 1. An
example of hexagonal placement of 105 sensors with non-covered gaps in between is given
in Figure 3.
Intuitively, a sensor placement with minimal overlapping or without overlapping must
be optimal if the distribution of the object’s position is uniform. Below in Section 2.1 we
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Figure 1: Rectagular area covered by seven sensors placed by using a hexagonal lattice.
show that this is often the case also for non-uniform distributions, and in Section 2.2 we
propose a procedure for close-to-optimal sensor placement.
2.1 Optimal allocation of two sensors
Does it make sense to let two sensors overlap? Having some overlap might be reasonable if
we want a better detection in most vulnerable regions. However, if the number of sensors
is limited then overlaps reduce the total coverage. In order to resolve this trade-off, we
consider the following simple model. We restrict ourselves to a one-dimensional area,
which constitutes an interval of length two, and a pair of sensors with r = 1/2. For each
of the two sensors, the detection probability is p and the probability of a false alarm is q.
The question is how to place these sensors so that the detection probability pdetection is
maximized.
Formally, let S = [0, 2] be the area under surveillance. Denote by x1 the leftmost point
of the first sensor’s coverage and by x2 the leftmost point of the second sensor’s coverage.
Thus, the first sensor covers the segment S1 = [x1, x1 + 1] and the second one covers the
segment S2 = [x2, x2 + 1], where x1 ∈ [0, 1] and x2 ∈ [x1, 1], as shown in Figure 2.
0 2
x1
S1
x2 S2
Figure 2: Partial overlapping of two sensors.
Now assume that the intruder location L has a distribution P (L ≤ x) = F (x), x ∈ [0, 2].
Then in the doubly covered segment S1 ∩ S2 the detection probability by the two-sensor
system is p2+2p(1−p), and the object is in this segment with probability F (x1+1)−F (x2).
In the singly covered segment (S1∪S2)\(S1∩S2) detection probability is p, and the object
is there with probability F (x2+1)−F (x1+1)+F (x2)−F (x1). Finally, in the remaining
uncovered part S \ (S1 ∪ S2) the detection probability is 0.
Rearranging the terms, we can formulate the problem of maximizing the detection
probability pdetection as follows:
max
x1,x2
{pdetection(x1, x2)} = max
x1,x2
{p (F (x2 + 1)− F (x1))+p(1−p) (F (x1 + 1)− F (x2))}. (1)
In general, in order to find an optimal pair (x1, x2) we need exact knowledge of F (x).
However, as a direct consequence of (1), we can provide the following particular decision
rule.
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Lemma 2.1. No-overlap principle. It is optimal to allocate sensors without overlap-
ping, if
1− p ≤ f(x)
f(x+ 1)
≤ 1
1− p
for every x ∈ [0, 1], where f(x) = dF (x)dx is the probability density function of the object
location.
Proof. By differentiating the expression to be maximized in (1), we show that it decreases
in x1, if f(x1)/f(x1 + 1) ≥ 1 − p, for every x1 ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, 0 is the optimal
value for x1. Similarly, this expression increases in x2 if f(x2)/f(x2 + 1) ≤ 1/(1 − p) for
x2 ∈ [0, 1], which sets 1 as the optimal value for x2.
The no-overlap principle indicates that it is optimal to maximize the coverage if the
distribution of the intruder’s position is sufficiently close to uniform. We illustrate the
no-overlap principle by means of two examples, namely one example where the principle
is applicable, and another where it is not.
Example 2.2. Assume that the intruder’s entering position has uniform distribution, i.e.,
f(x) = 1/2, for every x ∈ [0, 2]. In this case our decision rule says that it is optimal to
avoid any overlapping.
Example 2.3. Assume that the intruder’s position has a linear density function, e.g.,
f(x) = x/2, for every x ∈ [0, 2]. The no-overlap rule cannot give us an unambiguous
answer in this case. By solving (1), we obtain a more sophisticated joint sensor’s allocation:
x1 = min
{
1− p
p
, 1
}
and x2 = 1.
2.2 Sensor deployment in a 2-D area
Let N ∈ N, and let X ⊆ {1, . . . , N} × {1, . . . , N} be a two-dimensional discrete grid.
Further, for all x ∈ X , let f(x) be the probability that an object is at position x, provided
that there is an object in the area. As before, r is an effective sensing range of a sensor,
and p is the detection probability of one sensor. Our objective is to provide an algorithm
which finds the ‘optimal’ deployment of sensors in X , so that the probability to miss the
object is decreased as much as possible. Note that the problem now is discretized by
allowing only placements on some pre-specified points.
We say that a sensor is deployed at position y ∈ X if y is the center of the sensor’s
sensing range. Further, a tuple ~y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X n (n ∈ N ∪ {0}) is called a deploy-
ment of size n, if n sensors are deployed at positions y1, . . . , yn. We use ∅ for the empty
deployment.
Now, for x ∈ X , n ∈ N and ~y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X n, define g(~y | x) to be the probability
that an intruder is not detected by any of the sensors deployed at positions y1, . . . , yn
provided that the intruder’s position is x. Further, denote by pmissed(~y) the probability
that none of the sensors of the deployment ~y detects the intruder. Then, given that there
is an intruder in the area, we obtain:
pmissed(~y) =
∑
x∈X
f(x)g(~y | x), for ~y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X n, n ∈ N. (2)
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One can compute pmissed((y1, . . . , ym)) for all m ∈ {1, . . . , n} iteratively as follows. First,
note that, naturally, g(∅ | x) = 1 for all x ∈ X , and thus
pmissed(∅) =
∑
x∈X
f(x)g(∅ | x) =
∑
x∈X
f(x) = 1.
Next, let d : X ×X → R be the Euclidean distance function. Take m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x ∈ X
and consider a deployment (y1, . . . , ym) of size m. Since the sensors are independent, we
get
g((y1, . . . , ym) | x) = g((ym) | x)g((y1, . . . , ym−1) | x)
=
{
g((y1, . . . , ym−1) | x) if d(x, ym) > r
(1− p)g((y1, . . . , ym−1) | x) if d(x, ym) ≤ r. (3)
Now, given the deployment (y1, . . . , ym−1), the probability pmissed((y1, . . . , ym−1, ym)) can
be computed using (2) and (3).
Using the described iterative approach, we can now address two (closely related) opti-
mization problems: Minimum Size Deployment (MSD) and Minimum Probability Deploy-
ment (MPD).
• MSD: Given β ∈ [0, 1], find a deployment ~y of minimal size such that pmissed(~y) ≤ β.
• MPD: Given n ∈ N, find a deployment ~y of size n such that pmissed(~y) is minimal.
We provide a heuristic algorithm described below, which can be used for both problems.
The only difference is in the stopping criterion. In the main iterative step of the algorithm,
a sensor is added to the deployment in such a way that the non-detection probability
pmissed(·) is minimized (in case of a tie, the algorithm sticks to the candidate deployment
that has been found first). This implies that the algorithm will find a ‘locally optimal’
solution, not necessarily the globally optimal one.
The heuristic algorithm
1. Input:
• MSD: β ∈ [0, 1];
• MPD: n ∈ N.
2. Initialization: m := 0.
3. Iterative Step:
ym+1 := argmin
y∈X
pmissed((y1, . . . , ym, y)) = argmin
y∈X
∑
x∈X
f(x)g((y1, . . . , ym, y) | x),
where g((y1, . . . , ym, y) | x) is computed by (3) for all x ∈ X;
m := m+ 1.
4. Termination:
• MSD: pmissed((y1, . . . , ym)) ≤ β, then STOP;
• MPD: m = n, then STOP.
5. Output: ~y := (y1, . . . , ym).
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Note that there is a strong connection between the proposed algorithm and the no-
overlap principle (see Lemma 2.1). Indeed, (3) says that the deployment of a new sensor
at a position y reduces the non-detection probability f(x)g(~y|x) by a factor 1 − p for all
x such that d(x, y) ≤ r. Since, ideally, we would like to reduce the highest values of
f(x)g(~y|x), the equivalent formulation of the iterative step is as follows:
ym+1 := argmax
y∈X
∑
x:d(x,y)≤r
f(x)g((y1, . . . , ym) | x). (4)
Now assume that we have deployed two sensors, and our algorithm allowed an overlap.
Denote the sensing range of sensor i = 1, 2 by Si. Then, since (4) holds for the deployment
of sensor 2, it follows that∑
x∈S1∩S2
(1− p)f(x) +
∑
x∈S2\S1
f(x) ≥
∑
x∈S
f(x)
for any possible sensor range S in the area that does not overlap with S1. (Otherwise, S
could have been chosen instead of S2.) Since the density in the first term of the left-hand
side is taken with the factor 1−p we see that for the inequality to hold, the values of f(x)
in S1∩S2 and/or in S2\S1 should be considerably larger than in their neighborhoods. This
can be seen as the condition of the no-overlap principle, applied in two dimensions: overlap
is possible only if there exist positions x such that the density f(·) varies considerably (by
a factor of 1− p) within a sensor range of a sensor deployed in x.
In case two positions y would reduce the maximum non-detection probability by the
same amount, we can break the tie arbitrarily, e.g. by using the first such position en-
countered, or by doing this randomly. The actual tie-breaking procedure does not matter
too much on a global scale, because in the next iteration it is most likely that the other
position will be chosen, except if the two positions are close (within a distance 2r). Locally,
there may occur significant effects of tie-breaking. We did not study this, but this topic
warrants further investigation.
We have implemented the proposed algorithm in Mathematica. Below we present two
examples of the deployment which is the output of our algorithm. Another example will
be given in Section 5.
Example 2.4. Suppose X = {1, . . . , 200} × {1, . . . , 195}, p = 0.9 and r = 10. Moreover,
suppose that f is the uniform distribution. We can construct a hexagonal deployment
of 105 sensors in X such that an intruder cannot be within the range of two different
sensors (see Figure 3). It is easy to see that this deployment is optimal for the given
number of sensors, and a simple calculation shows that the non-detection probability of
this deployment is 0.255. Deploying the 105 sensors according to our algorithm leads to
the deployment shown in Figure 4. The non-detection probability of this deployment is
0.267 which is close to the non-detection probability of the optimal hexagonal deployment.
Example 2.5. Suppose X = {0, . . . , 100} × {0, . . . , 100}, p = 0.8 and r = 10. Moreover,
define σ = 25 and define rx as the distance of x to the north-east axis (the line y = x)
of X for each x ∈ X . Now suppose that f(x) = ce− 12 ( rxσ )2 for all x ∈ X , where c is the
normalization constant making f a probability distribution on X . In other words, the
signed distance between the intruder’s position and the north-east axis of X follows a
discrete version of the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ = 25.
Here, the sign is positive for positions above the line, and negative for those below.
Having 200 sensors at our disposal, applying our algorithm leads to the deployment
in Figure 5. As one would expect, the density of the sensor deployment increases when
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Figure 3: The hexagonal deployment of 105 sensors.
Figure 4: Deployment of 105 sensors according to the MPD algorithm: uniform distribu-
tion of the object location.
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Figure 5: Deployment of 200 sensors according to the MPD algorithm: normal distribution
of the signed distance between the object location and the north-east axis.
approaching the north-east axis. Moreover, a simple calculation shows that the non-
detection probability of this deployment is 0.066.
We conclude that our heuristic algorithm can be used to find deployments which result
in a good detection probability and are in line with the analytical results from Section 2.1.
In particular, in the case of a uniform a priori probability distribution of the intruder
position we found a nearly optimal solution.
3 Statistical methods for intruder detection
Optimal sensor deployment studied in the previous section is important for increasing the
overall detection probability, that is, the number of true alarms produced by the system.
However, since the false alarm probability q can be high in practice (e.g. q can be about
2%, which already has a considerable impact), sensor networks may even produce multiple
false alarms at each moment in time. Still, the presence of an intruder increases the number
of alarms, and after several observations one should be able to recognize an intrusion and
report an alarm. To this end, we present in this section two statistical methods for intruder
detection: one is based on classical hypothesis testing, and the other employs a Bayesian
approach.
The hypothesis testing approach in Section 3.1 provides a decision making tool for
reporting an intrusion alarm after a single observation of n identical sensors. In practice,
false alarm reports are highly undesirable. Therefore, we bound the probability of a false
report by choosing a high confidence level of the test. This sometimes leads to a poor
performance of the test in a sense that with high probability, after one observation of n
sensors, an object will stay undetected. In practice, however, this is not a big problem
because there is usually enough time to produce several observations, not necessarily by
the same sensor. Then the probability of the intruder’s presence can be updated after each
observation, for instance, using the Bayesian approach described in Section 3.2.
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The Bayesian approach allows for great flexibility, because, along with the total number
of alarms, it also takes into account the locations of the alarms. Therefore, in Section 3.2
we analyze a more general model than in Section 3.1. Specifically, we consider several non-
overlapping parts of the coverage area, each deploying a number of completely overlapping
sensors. Furthermore, we let the intrusion probabilities, as well as the detection and false
alarm probabilities, depend on the sensor location. The motivation for this model is that
although identical sensors will usually cover parts of the intrusion area with roughly equal
sizes, the terrain in which the sensors are placed may vary, e.g. in altitude, which can
influence the local intrusion probabilities and the performance of the sensors.
3.1 Hypothesis testing for intruder detection
In the following, we consider the two extreme cases:
– Case I: n sensors, all at the same position; i.e. with identical sensing range;
– Case II: n non-overlapping sensors.
If there is an object in the area, then Case I is the case in which all sensors follow
the same Bernoulli distribution with parameter p and Case II is the case that one of the
sensors detects the object with probability p and each of the remaining sensors detect the
object with probability q.
Assume that there can be at most one object in the area. Within the hypothesis testing
formulation, we test the null-hypothesis that there is no intruder in the area against the
alternative that the area is penetrated. If a critical number of alarms is observed then
we reject the null-hypothesis and report an intrusion alarm. For i = 1, . . . , n let [Yi = 1]
be the event that sensor i detects an object and [Yi = 0] be the complementary event.
Assuming that there is an intruder in the range of sensor i, we have P (Yi = 1) = p.
Consider Case I: n sensors deployed at the same position with 100% overlap. Thus,
our hypothesis testing formulation is as follows:
Case I:
{
H0 : P (Yi = 1) = q for all i = 1, . . . , n,
H1 : P (Yi = 1) = p for all i = 1, . . . , n.
In Case II, the sensors are not overlapping. Thus, the object can penetrate the range
of at most one sensor. This leads to the following formalization:
Case II:

H0 : P (Yi = 1) = q for all i = 1, . . . , n,
H1 : P (Yj = 1) = p for exactly one j = 1, . . . , n;
P (Yi = 1) = q for i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= j.
In both cases, as a statistic, we use the stochastic variable T = Y1+· · ·+Yn, the number
of alarms produced by the system. We reject H0 if and only if T ≥ c, for some critical
c > 0. Clearly, under H0, T has a Binomial(n, q) distribution. Denote the Binomial
density function with parameters n and p at k by Bn,p(k):
Bn,p(k) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k. (5)
In our test, two types of errors can be made: false positives and false negatives (in
statistical terms, type-one and type-two error, respectively). A false positive means a false
report, i.e., an intruder alarm is reported while there is no object in the area. In both
Cases I and II, one has
pfalse = P (false positive) = PH0(T ≥ c) =
n∑
k=c
Bn,q(k).
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n 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
q
0.02 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.04 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
0.06 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
0.08 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.10 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0.12 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
0.14 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
0.16 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4
0.18 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4
0.20 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4
Table 1: Critical number of alarms c for Cases I and II.
n 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150
q
0.02 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6
0.04 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 10
0.06 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14
0.08 3 5 7 8 10 12 13 15 16 18
0.10 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 19 21
0.12 4 7 9 12 14 16 18 20 23 25
0.14 4 7 10 13 16 18 21 23 26 28
0.16 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32
0.18 5 9 12 16 19 22 26 29 32 35
0.20 6 10 14 17 21 24 28 31 35 38
Table 2: Critical number of alarms c for Cases I and II.
We choose c in such a way that the above probability does not exceed an acceptable
frequency of false alarm reports. A false negative means that an intruder is missed by the
system, i.e., the intrusion alarm will not be reported while there was an object in the area.
For Case I, we get
pImissed = P (false negative) = PH1(T < c) =
c−1∑
k=0
Bn,p(k),
and for Case II, we obtain
pIImissed = P (false negative) = p
c−2∑
k=0
Bn−1,q(k) + (1− p)
c−1∑
k=0
Bn−1,q(k).
In this setting, the detection probability pdetection of the system is equal to the power of
the statistical test, i.e.,
pdetection = 1− P (false negative).
We select some values for p and q and calculate corresponding values of c and pdetection
so that pfalse ≤ 0.05. In Tables 1 and 2 we present the values of c for Cases I and II.
Table 3 gives the values of pdetection for Case I, whereas Tables 4 and 5 give the values for
Case II. In all the tables, the single-sensor detection probability is fixed at p = 0.9. The
values of c used in Tables 3–5 are chosen according to the results of Tables 1 and 2.
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n 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
q
0.02 0.9990 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.04 0.9990 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.06 0.9990 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.08 0.9990 0.9999 0.9995 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.10 0.9990 0.9963 0.9995 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.12 0.9990 0.9963 0.9995 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.14 0.9720 0.9963 0.9995 0.9999 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.16 0.9720 0.9963 0.9995 0.9987 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.18 0.9720 0.9963 0.9995 0.9987 0.9998 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000
0.20 0.9720 0.9963 0.9914 0.9987 0.9998 0.9996 0.9999 1.0000
Table 3: Values of pdetection for Case I; p = 0.9.
n 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
q
0.02 0.9000 0.9001 0.9002 0.9004 0.9006 0.9008 0.9010 0.9013
0.04 0.9002 0.9005 0.9009 0.9015 0.9022 0.9029 0.9038 0.2772
0.06 0.9004 0.9010 0.9020 0.9032 0.2795 0.3170 0.3524 0.3857
0.08 0.9006 0.9018 0.2554 0.3073 0.3551 0.3993 0.4402 0.4780
0.10 0.9010 0.2440 0.3099 0.3694 0.4233 0.4721 0.1687 0.2035
0.12 0.9014 0.2868 0.3609 0.4265 0.4846 0.1816 0.2242 0.2672
0.14 0.2344 0.3278 0.4087 0.4788 0.1807 0.2310 0.2817 0.3318
0.16 0.2650 0.3670 0.4534 0.1654 0.2232 0.2818 0.3396 0.1473
0.18 0.2948 0.4044 0.4951 0.2006 0.2672 0.3332 0.1454 0.1907
0.20 0.3240 0.4400 0.1629 0.2371 0.3119 0.1337 0.1838 0.2376
Table 4: Values of pdetection for Case II; p = 0.9.
n 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150
q
0.02 0.9031 0.4010 0.1989 0.3008 0.1680 0.2404 0.1421 0.1975 0.1208 0.1648
0.04 0.3935 0.2944 0.2346 0.1922 0.1599 0.1344 0.1138 0.0968 0.1569 0.1337
0.06 0.1841 0.2288 0.1114 0.1298 0.1429 0.1526 0.0876 0.0945 0.1004 0.1053
0.08 0.2811 0.1813 0.1252 0.1759 0.1255 0.0909 0.1183 0.0875 0.1094 0.0822
0.10 0.1434 0.1448 0.1339 0.1213 0.1091 0.0980 0.0879 0.0789 0.1135 0.1009
0.12 0.2103 0.1157 0.1393 0.0836 0.0943 0.1020 0.1077 0.1117 0.0741 0.0772
0.14 0.2836 0.1952 0.1424 0.1065 0.0810 0.1040 0.0798 0.0971 0.0754 0.0891
0.16 0.1583 0.1567 0.1438 0.1297 0.1164 0.1044 0.0935 0.0839 0.0753 0.0677
0.18 0.2143 0.1253 0.1440 0.0908 0.0987 0.1036 0.0691 0.0722 0.0743 0.0756
0.20 0.1180 0.0995 0.0792 0.1084 0.0833 0.1020 0.0790 0.0925 0.0725 0.0828
Table 5: Values of pdetection for Case II; p = 0.9.
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As we see in Case I, pdetection is very high. This is not surprising because in fact, in
this case we have to distinguish between Binomial(n, p) and Binomial(n, q) distributions.
This can be done with a good precision because of a large difference between p and q. For
instance, for 10 sensors, p = 0.9, q = 0.02, and c = 5, the probability pdetection is 0.9999
while pfalse is as small as 7.4× 10−7.
In Case II, pdetection is low except for the cases when c = 1, that is, a detection signal
of one sensor already triggers an intrusion alarm. The value c > 1 is obtained when the
probability of just one alarm is reasonably high even if there is no intruder in the area.
Effectively, c > 1 means that at least c− 1 false alarms are needed to detect the intruder.
This is an undesirable result, which explains, in particular, the low power of the test.
We conclude that in Case II one observation is simply not enough for efficient intruder
detection, because in this case the observations with and without the intruder differ by at
most one signal, which is difficult to reveal by classical hypothesis testing. One either has
to make sensors overlap (as in Case I) or use several observations in a row. The latter can
be done in several ways, for instance, one can use the Viterbi algorithm as in Section 4.
3.2 Bayesian approach for intruder detection
Consider Case II from the previous section, where n ∈ N different sensors are placed in
such a way that the sensing ranges of different sensors do not overlap. Let X ∈ {0, 1}
denote the number of intruders present, with P (X = 1) = α an a priori probability of the
intruder being present in the area. As before, let T be the stochastic variable denoting the
total number of single-sensor alarms given at a particular time instant, so T ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}.
We have
P (X = 0 | T = k) = P (T = k | X = 0)P (X = 0)
P (T = k | X = 0)P (X = 0) + P (T = k | X = 1)P (X = 1) .
Let F be the (unobservable) number of false alarms among the T . Then for all k ≥ 0 we
obtain
P (T = k | X = 1) = P (T = k, F = k − 1 | X = 1) + P (T = k, F = k | X = 1)
= pBn−1,q(k − 1) + (1− p)Bn−1,q(k)
= Bn,q(k)
[
kp
nq +
(n−k)(1−p)
n(1−q)
]
,
P (T = k | X = 0) = Bn,q(k).
Hence, the a posteriori probability of the presence of an object is
P (X = 1 | T = k) = 1− P (T = k | X = 0)P (X = 0)
P (T = k | X = 0)P (X = 0) + P (T = k | X = 1)P (X = 1)
= 1− 1
1 + P (T=k|X=1)P (X=1)P (T=k|X=0)P (X=0)
= 1−
(
1 + α1−α
[
kp
nq +
(n−k)(1−p)
n(1−q)
])−1
. (6)
This formula can be generalized to the case combining Cases I and II from Section 3.1 as
follows. Assume n non-overlapping ranges. Range i = 1, . . . , n containsmi ∈ N completely
overlapping sensors. Let Ti ∈ {0, ..,mi} be the number of alarms for range i and denote
~T = (T1, ..., Tn).
The stochastic variables Xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n, indicating the presence of an object
in range i, have a priori probabilities P (Xi = 1) = αi i.e., we allow certain parts of the
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area to have a higher a priori probability for intrusion than others. Also, we allow the
detection and false alarm probabilities to depend on the sensor range; we use pi and qi to
denote these respectively.
Since we assume that there can be at most one intruder at any given time instant,
the vector ~X = (X1, . . . , Xn) can attain values in the set {ej : j = 0, . . . , n} where ej is
the jth unit vector in Rn and e0 the zero vector in that space. We will use the notation
N = {0, 1, ..., n}. We then calculate
P ( ~X = ej | ~T = ~k)
=
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej)P ( ~X = ej)
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej)P ( ~X = ej) + P (~T = ~k | ~X 6= ej)P ( ~X 6= ej)
=
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej)P ( ~X = ej)
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej)P ( ~X = ej) +
∑
s∈N\{j} P (~T = ~k | ~X = es)P ( ~X = es)
.
Further, we immediately have for j > 0 that
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej) = Bmj ,pj (kj)
∏
i∈N\{j}
Bmi,qi(ki). (7)
If we define m0 = k0 = 0, this formula also holds for j = 0. Furthermore, if we define
α0 = 1−
∑
i∈N\{0} αi, we can state
P ( ~X = ej | ~T = ~k)
=
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej)P ( ~X = ej)
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej)P ( ~X = ej) +
∑
s∈N\{j} P (~T = ~k | ~X = es)P ( ~X = es)
=
(
1 +
∑
s∈N\{j} P (~T=~k| ~X=es)P ( ~X=es)
P (~T=~k| ~X=ej)P ( ~X=ej)
)−1
=
(
1 +
∑
s∈N\{j} αsBms,ps (ks)
∏
i∈N\{s}Bmi,qi (ki)
αjBmj,pj (kj)
∏
v∈N\{j}Bmv,qv (kv)
)−1
=
1 + ∑
s∈N\{j}
αs
αj
(psqs )
ks(1−ps1−qs )
ms−ks(pjqj )
−kj (1−pj1−qj )
−(mj−kj)
−1
=
(∑
s∈N
αs
αj
(psqs )
ks(1−ps1−qs )
ms−ks(pjqj )
−kj (1−pj1−qj )
−(mj−kj)
)−1
=
αj(
pj
qj
)kj (1−pj1−qj )
mj−kj∑
s∈N αs(
ps
qs
)ks(1−ps1−qs )
ms−ks . (8)
For j = 0, we thus find
P ( ~X = e0 | ~T = ~k) =
1−∑i∈N\{0} αi
1−∑i∈N\{0} αi +∑s∈N\{0} αs(psqs )ks(1−ps1−qs )ms−ks ,
so the conditional probability of an intruder given the observed area alarms vector ~T equals
P ( ~X 6= e0 | ~T = ~k) = 1− P ( ~X = e0 | ~T = ~k)
= 1−
(
1 +
∑
s∈N\{0} αs(
ps
qs
)ks(1−ps1−qs )
ms−ks
1−∑i∈N\{0} αi
)−1
.
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Notice that the Case II treated in Section 3.1 corresponds to
pi = p, qi = q, mi = 1, αi = α/n,
for all i ∈ N and we then find back our earlier formula (6) for the conditional probability
of an intrusion.
In the case where we use only one time instant to observe the alarms, it seems natural
to conclude that an intruder is present whenever
A(~k) = P ( ~X 6= e0 | ~T = ~k) = 1−
(
1 +
∑
s∈N\{0} αs(
ps
qs
)ks(1−ps1−qs )
ms−ks
1−∑i∈N\{0} αi
)−1
(9)
satisfies A(~k) ≥ γ for some critical threshold γ, where e.g. we can choose γ ∈ (0.5, 1),
which means that we raise an alarm whenever the conditional probability of an intruder
is sufficiently larger than the conditional probability that there is no intruder. The prob-
ability of a false intrusion alarm then becomes
pfalse = P ( (A(~T ) ≥ γ) ∧ ( ~X = e0) )
=
∑
~0≤~k≤~m
1{A(~k)≥γ}P (~T =
~k | ~X = e0)P ( ~X = e0),
where we use the shorthand notation ~0 ≤ ~k ≤ ~m for {~k : 0 ≤ ki ≤ mi, i ∈ N}. The
probability of a missed intrusion is
pmissed = P ( (A(~T ) < γ) ∧ ( ~X 6= e0) )
=
∑
~0≤~k≤~m
1{A(~k)<γ}
∑
j∈N\{0}
P (~T = ~k | ~X = ej)P ( ~X = ej).
By substituting (7) and (9) in these expressions, we can now calculate explicitly what the
probabilities of a false intrusion alarm or missed intrusion are (based on a single observation
in time) for the given a priori probabilities in ~p and ~q and a given sensor configuration
vector ~m.
We note that the Bayesian approach can be also extended to a sequence of observations.
For instance, the a posteriori probabilities obtained by using (8) after the first observation,
can be substituted back into (8) instead of αj ’s to recompute the probabilities of the
intruder’s presence after the second observation, and so on.
4 Viterbi algorithm for intruder detection
In this section, we present a novel method of using sequential observations for intruder
detection. We model the signals from the sensors as a so-called hidden Markov model.
This is a stochastic process, based on a Markov chain to which noise is added. Using this
representation we can distinguish between the signals that should have been given off by
the sensors, i.e. the ‘true’ state of the system, and the signals that are actually given off,
including the false alarms and missed detections.
Given a sequence of signals we determine the most likely sequence of true states, using
the so-called Viterbi algorithm. In this way, we decide whether the signals indicate indeed
an intruder, or are only false alarms. From this we derive a decision rule for when to report
an intrusion alarm, thus reducing the number of false reports. All calculations needed to
obtain this rule can be pre-computed.
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We outline the proposed method for the case of one sensor. In particular, we explain
the hidden Markov model, and illustrate how, based on a few signals from the sensor, we
decide if an intrusion alarm should be given. We indicate how the method can be extended
to networks of sensors. As the state space, and so the number of calculations, increases
exponentially with the number of sensors, we show how to truncate it in a clever way.
4.1 A one-sensor model
Consider the case of one sensor, where an object possibly passes by. Assuming a low speed
of the object, the object is in the range of the sensor for multiple time steps. Let the
stochastic process {Xt}t∈IN denote if an object is in the range of the sensor, where
Xt =
{
1 if an object is in the range of the sensor at time t,
0 otherwise.
So Xt gives the ‘true’ state of the system at time t.
We assume that the process {Xt} is a Markov chain, so the probability law for Xt+1
only depends on Xt. Denote pij = P (Xt+1 = j | Xt = i). The speed of the object
and its path through the range of the sensor are modelled in the transition probabilities.
The number of consecutive ones in a Markov chain follows a geometric distribution, with
E(# of steps in sensor range) = 1/p10. We want the stationary distribution of {Xt}, say
X∞, to be such that P (X∞ = 1) = 1 − P (X∞ = 0) = α, the a priori probability that
there is an object in the system. This gives the following transition probability matrix A:
A =
(
1− α1−αp10 α1−αp10
p10 1− p10
)
.
We take the initial distribution for X0 to be equal to the stationary distribution.
To the process {Xt} we add noise, which consists of false alarms and missed detections.
This gives the process of signals given off by the sensor, say {Yt}t∈IN. Let
Yt =
{
1 if the sensor gives an alarm at time t,
0 otherwise.
So Yt is the observed state at time t. The noise is such that Yt only depends on Xt, in an
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) way. A false alarm occurs when [Yt = 1]
given [Xt = 0], and this happens with probability q. A missed detection occurs if [Yt = 0]
given [Xt = 1], and this happens with probability 1− p.
We now have that the process {Yt} is a hidden Markov model [11]. We can interpret
{Yt} as observing {Xt} via a noisy channel. Only the process {Yt} is observed, while
the states of the process {Xt} are not known, i.e. hidden, which explains the name of
this model. The process {Xt} is often referred to as the underlying or hidden process.
Whereas for a Markov chain it holds that the next state of the process depends only on
the previous state, or a fixed number of previous states, for a hidden Markov model the
transition probabilities depend on the entire history of the process.
4.2 The Viterbi algorithm for the one-sensor model
Given a sequence of observed states, say O = {O1, O2, . . . , OL}, the question now rises,
what is the most likely sequence of underlying (‘true’) states, Q = {Q1, Q2, . . . , QL}.
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There is an efficient algorithm for solving this problem, called the Viterbi algorithm [6].
This algorithm, based on dynamic programming, calculates
max
Q
P (Q | O).
Applying this algorithm we are able to correct false alarms and missed detections for a
given sequence of observations. For example, a single one in between many zeros is likely
to be a false alarm, while a zero in between many ones is probably a missed detection.
If we, for instance, observe the sequence 000111011000 then it is not surprising that the
most likely underlying state sequence is 000111111000, i.e., a missed detection is corrected.
More important are the corrections of false alarms. The observed sequence 0001000 will
most likely have an underlying sequence of all zeros, so a false alarm is corrected. In this
way, we prevent reporting a false intrusion alarm. While for these two examples the most
likely underlying states are straightforward to see, the algorithm also helps with cases like
00010100. Here, it is not immediately clear whether the ones are two false alarms, or the
zero in between represents a missed detection.
Based on the results of this algorithm, we give a decision rule whether or not to report
an intrusion alarm for a given sequence of observations. We illustrate this for two and
for three consecutive observed states, but it can be done for every desired number of
observations. We give an intrusion alarm if the most likely underlying state sequence
contains at least one 1 in it, signifying that in the most likely scenario, an intrusion took
place in at least one moment in time. We also calculate the probability that the underlying
state sequence consists of only zeros, given the observation. One minus this quantity equals
the probability that there was an intruder. The latter is equal to the probability pmissed
that the intruder will pass undetected in case the sequence of all zeros happens to be most
likely. All calculations can be done off-line, resulting in a list of observed states for which
an intrusion alarm should be given.
For the values p = 0.9, q = 0.02, α = 0.01 and E(# of steps in sensor range) = 10,
the probabilities for all possible combinations of states are given in Table 6 for two and
three consecutive observations. For two observations, we only give an intrusion alarm
in case both observations are a 1. With probability 0.9441 this is indeed the underlying
sequence, and the probability that there was no intruder is about 0.05. Giving no intrusion
alarm when the observed sequence contained two or one zeros turns out to be correct with
probabilities 0.9997 and 0.92, respectively. For three observations, there are four cases for
which we give an intrusion alarm. To improve the probability of correct decisions further,
one could make use of more consecutive observations.
For this model we have assumed that {Xt} is a Markov chain. The number of steps
in the range of the sensor is geometrically distributed, which models a variable speed and
direction of the object. We can improve this by letting {Xt} be a Markov chain of order
k, where the probability law of Xt+1 depends on the last k states: Xt−k+1, . . . , Xt. This
allows us to vary the distribution of the number of steps in the sensor range. For instance,
in this way one can model a deterministic number of steps. The state space then increases
to 2k states, but the problem remains numerically tractable since the calculations for the
decision rule need to be done only once.
4.3 A sensor-network model
We can extend this method to networks of several sensors. Consider for instance the
following example with n = 4 non-overlapping sensors as given in Figure 6. Let ~XTt =(
X1,t, X2,t, X3,t, X4,t
)
, where Xi,t = 1 if there is an intrusion in the range of sensor i at
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O Q alarm? P (Q | O) P (Q = ~0 | O)
0 0 0 0 No 0.9997 0.9997
0 1 0 0 No 0.9196 0.9196
1 0 0 0 No 0.9196 0.9196
1 1 1 1 Yes 0.9441 0.0512
0 0 0 0 0 0 No 0.9998 0.9998
0 0 1 0 0 0 No 0.9491 0.9491
0 1 0 0 0 0 No 0.9833 0.9833
0 1 1 0 1 1 Yes 0.4016 0.2177
1 0 0 0 0 0 No 0.9491 0.9491
1 0 1 1 1 1 Yes 0.6060 0.3577
1 1 0 1 1 0 Yes 0.4016 0.2177
1 1 1 1 1 1 Yes 0.9936 0.0013
Table 6: Hidden Markov Model for the case of one sensor. For each observed state O the
most likely underlying state Q is given.
time t, and Xi,t = 0 otherwise, i = 1, 2, 3, 4; t ≥ 1. Assume that there is at most one object
in the area at any moment in time, so that the state space of { ~Xt} consists of n + 1 = 5
states: the all-zero state and the states where the object is in the range of one of the n
sensors. We assume the process { ~Xt} again to be Markov. The path and the speed of the
object are modelled in the transition probabilities. This can be based on historical data,
or on other knowledge about the system. If the object can remain in the range of one
sensor for several time steps, pii is positive. Here, we assume that the object always enters
via sensor 1, and then continues its path through sensor 2, 3 or 4, or outside the range of
any of these sensors. The transition probabilities and the corresponding states are given
by
A =

1− α α 0 0 0
1− p1• p11 p12 p13 p14
1− p22 0 p22 0 0
1− p33 0 0 p33 0
1− p44 0 0 0 p44
 ,
(0, 0, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 0, 1)
with the necessary conditions on the pij imposed to let A be a stochastic matrix. Here,
p1• =
∑4
j=1 p1j .
The probability law of observing ~Yt given ~Xt follows a multinomial distribution. As
before, there are four possibilities for the pair (Xi,t, Yi,t), specifically, P (Yi,t = 1|Xi,t =
0) = q and P (Yi,t = 0|Xi,t = 1) = 1− p.
The state space of {~Yt} now consists of 2n states: each sensor can give an alarm or not.
As the size of the state space grows exponentially with n, already for a moderately large
number of sensors n the problem becomes huge. Because of this, but moreover because
many of these states are very unlikely to occur, we truncate the state space of {~Yt}. For
this, we calculate the number of false alarms, say c, that has a probability of occurring
less than say 0.001:
P (# false alarms > c) < 0.001.
Now we allow only the vectors ~Yt in the state space of {~Yt} that are at Hamming distance
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Figure 6: A network with four sensors. Indicated are possible transitions.
≤ c away from any of the states of { ~Xt}, where the Hamming distance between two zero-
one vectors is the number of indices in which they are different. In this way, we drastically
reduce the state space of {~Yt}, making the calculations more tractable.
We now again have a hidden Markov model, for which we can derive a decision rule
when to give an intrusion alarm in the same way as for the case of one sensor. We can
list all possible sequences of a number of observations of the process {~Yt}. By the Viterbi
algorithm, we calculate the most likely underlying state sequences of the process { ~Xt}.
If it contains at least one 1, for such a sequence an intrusion alarm should be given. By
calculating the probability that the underlying states are only zeros, the probability of
making an error is found.
The hidden Markov model method of the present section can be used in combination
with the heuristic algorithm for placement of sensors presented in Section 2. One way
of doing this to use the Viterbi method to combine the results of multiple single-sensor
readings into one result, giving improved values for p and q that can be used in the
placement algorithm. This is done in some of the numerical experiments of the next
section.
5 Numerical results
We verify and combine the proposed methods for sensor deployment and intruder detection
using a simulation model of a network consisting of a number of individual sensors, which
perform under uncertainty. The performance of each individual sensor is characterized
by the probability of true detection p and the probability of false alarm q. As before,
we use similar performance measures for characterizing the performance of the sensor
network. Thus, our performance measures are the probability of true detection of the
network pdetection and the probability of a false intrusion alarm pfalse.
The objective of a surveillance wireless sensor network (SWSN) design is to get a value
pdetection that is as high as possible and a value of pfalse that is as small as possible. In this
study, we explore numerically the possibility of affecting the values pdetection and pfalse of
the sensors by arranging their locations as well as by exploiting multiple readings. In the
numerical experiments, we estimate pdetection and pfalse for an SWSN. Numerically, these
measures are defined as follows:
pdetection =
Ndetection
N
, (10)
pfalse =
Nfalse
N
, (11)
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where Ndetection and Nfalse are the number of true and false detections respectively, while
N is the total number of experiments, with or without the object in the area, respectively.
The experimental setup is as follows. The presence of an object in the SWSN is simu-
lated N times, and the intrusion alarm is reported based on the readings of n individual
sensors, according to the criteria of detection, e.g. as in Sections 3 and 4. Then pdetection is
computed by formula (10). In this study, N is set to 1000. To account for the variability
of the simulation results, we have repeated all experiments 100 times. The estimate of
pdetection is represented by the average of the results as well as by the standard deviation.
The results are also presented as a histogram, where the x-axis gives the values of the
estimates obtained and the y-axis represents the relative frequency of occurrence of the
estimates. The same experimental setup is used for computing the pfalse of the SWSN by
setting the object to reside outside of the SWSN coverage area for N consecutive times and
then using (11). In all the experiments presented here, the individual sensors are identical
with p = 0.9 and q = 0.02. The other parameters are varied in the different examples to
obtain the most demonstrative results.
To verify that our simulation gives correct estimates of pdetection and pfalse, we first
perform an experiment using a simple sensor network of one sensor but with two consec-
utive readings. In this case, as suggested by the Viterbi algorithm from Section 4, the
criterium of an intrusion alarm is that the sensor raises an alarm in two consecutive read-
ings. Since the two readings are independent of each other, we have pdetection = p2 = 0.81
and pfalse = q2 = 0.0004. The numerical results shown in Figure 7 demonstrate that the
numerical method gives accurate estimates.
Figure 7: (Left) Estimate of pdetection for one sensor with two consecutive readings. The
mean is 0.8093, the standard deviation is 0.0181. (Right) Estimate of pfalse: the mean of
the estimate is 4.4× 10−4 and the standard deviation is 6.9× 10−4.
In the example above, we have verified that our simulation program gives correct
estimates of pdetection and pfalse. As a next step, in our simulation model we will combine
the results on sensor deployment and intruder detection from the previous sections to
detect a moving target. The area of interest is assumed to be the unit square, defined by
x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [0, 1], where (x, y) represents the location of a point. We describe the
motion of an object using the white noise acceleration model described e.g. in [3, p. 263]:
xo(tk+1) = xo(tk) + vxdt+
√
dtaxηx(tk), (12)
yo(tk+1) = yo(tk) + vydt+
√
dtayηy(tk), (13)
where (xo(tk), yo(tk)) represents the object coordinate at time tk, dt the time step, vx and
vy the velocity in the x and y direction, respectively, ax and ay the acceleration terms,
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and ηx and ηy the noise terms, which are independent standard-normally distributed at
each time step. The values of vx, vy, ax and ay are all set to 0.01 and dt is equal to 0.1.
For illustration, we presented two realizations of the object’s motion in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Some realizations of the object path used in the experiments; t0 is the starting
point and t1 is the end point.
Now we would like to investigate the impact of sensor deployment. To this end, consider
an SWSN consisting of eight individual sensors. Three different sensor arrangements are
studied. In arrangements A and B, the locations of the sensors are determined randomly.
In arrangement C, the sensors are located according to the MPD deployment algorithm
from Section 2.2. Therefore, the sensors in arrangement C are located along a diagonal
of the area of interest since these are the most likely locations of the object. The SWSN
arrangements are depicted in Figure 9. The position of the object is depicted by an asterisk
and the sensor that gives an intrusion alarm by a highlighted circle.
Figure 9: Example of sensor networks: (left) network A; (middle) network B; (right)
network C.
In this study, we have computed the pdetection and pfalse of the three sensor networks
by exploiting the multiple readings by each sensor. Since the sensing ranges practically
do not overlap, we are in the situation of Case II of Section 3.1. However, since each
sensor raises an alarm based on the results of k readings according to the decision rule
from Table 6, we have to adjust the probabilities p and q to the detection probability p(k)
and the false alarm probability q(k) for k = 1, 2, 3. Simple calculations give:
p(1) = p, q(1) = q;
p(2) = p2, q(2) = q2;
p(3) = p3 + 3p2(1− p), q(3) = q3 + 3q2(1− q).
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According to Table 1, the critical value for q = 0.02 is 1, that is the SWSN should give an
intrusion alarm if the alarm is coming from at least one of the sensors. Since q(2) and q(3)
are smaller than q = 0.02 the critical value remains the same if we use multiple readings
from each sensor. Thus, if k readings of each sensor are used at each time point, for our
three SWSN arrangements we have
pdetection = pcoverage · p(k), (14)
pfalse = 1− (1− q(k))8, (15)
where pcoverage is the probability that the object is within the network coverage, i.e., within
one of the sensor ranges. Clearly, p(k) in (14) and pfalse in (15) are identical for the layouts
A, B and C if the same number of readings is used. In this case, the performance of the
SWSN is determined by how likely the object will pass through the network coverage,
allowing the network to detect the existence of the object. This relative frequency is the
estimate of the probability pcoverage that affects pdetection in (14).
To estimate pcoverage, we simulate the object’s motion into the area for each sensor
network and compute the relative frequency of the object passing through the sensor
network coverage. As in the previous experiments, the object is allowed to move inside
the area of interest for 1000 time steps. Moreover, the experiments are repeated 100 times
to account for the variability in the estimates. The results are presented in Figure 10.
The estimates of pcoverage are 0.2884, 0.1420, and 0.6367 for sensor network A, B, and C,
Figure 10: Estimate of pcoverage of SWSN. (Left) Network A. The mean of the estimate
is 0.2884 and the standard deviation is 0.0698. (Middle) Network B. The mean of the
estimate is 0.1420 and the standard deviation is 0.0631. (Right) Network C. The mean of
the estimate is 0.6367 and the standard deviation is 0.2658.
respectively. The conclusion is that the SWSN C is more likely to detect the object than
the others.
Now, consider an SWSN of 50 sensors deployed by means of the MPD algorithm from
Section 2.2 (see Figure 11). As before, the advancing of the object in the area is described
by (12) and (13), where we choose vx = 0.02, vy = 0.02, ax = 0.001, ay = 0.01. Again, we
report an intrusion alarm if a sensor signals an intruder in two consecutive readings, as
suggested in Table 6 in case of two observations. In Figure 11, we show one time instant of
a simulation run. An asterisk denotes the object position. The two overlapping highlighted
circles depict the two sensors that give a correct intrusion alarm. The highlighted circle
that does not contain the object, gives a false alarm.
For this network, the rate of false intrusion alarms is 0.0004. Furthermore, since the
SWSN consists of an ample amount of sensors, our deployment strategy ensures that
pcoverage (almost) equals one. The histogram for the detection probability at each time
point is given in Figure 12. The high values of pdetection are due to a considerable overlap
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Figure 11: One time instant of a simulation run of the SWSN of 50 sensors containing a
moving object (∗). Highlighted circles: two correct intrusion alarms and one false alarm.
Figure 12: Estimate of pdetection of the SWSN in Figure 11. The mean of the estimate is
0.9205 and the standard deviation is 0.0224.
of sensor ranges for the most likely positions of the object.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we addressed two problems concerning design and performance of an SWSN:
sensor placement and object detection. For the first problem, we suggest to use a hexagonal
placement for optimal coverage. Further, we recommend to cover most vulnerable locations
first, but avoid an overlap in sensor ranges unless the distribution of the object position is
highly irregular. As a rule of thumb, one may call a distribution highly irregular if there
exist pairs of points such that the distance between two points in such a pair is ≤ 2r while
the value of the density differs by a factor 1− p.
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For the detection problem, we state that several observations of the same object are
absolutely necessary to report an alarm with reasonable certainty. A classical hypothesis
testing works well only if multiple sensors overlap in the same location. Otherwise, one
must use information from consecutive readings of the SWSN. In the latter case, either
a Bayesian approach or a hidden Markov model (HMM) approach can be used for object
detection. To the best of our knowledge, the HMM approach involving the Viterbi algo-
rithm to filter out the noise of non-detections and false alarms, has never been used in an
SWSN before. The advantage of this approach is that it allows to pre-compute off-line
all observation patterns that signal an intruder. Then the decision rule is very simple:
report an intruder if one of the alarming patterns is observed. The HMM techniques in
the SWSN context definitely deserve further study.
In this research, one could clearly see that the two problems under consideration are
closely related. Although each of the proposed methods may be useful in its own right, it is
essential to develop an integral approach to sensor deployment and intruder detection, in
order to enhance the SWSN performance. In the last numerical example (see Section 5),
we demonstrated that our techniques can be successfully combined, thus considerably
increasing the efficiency of the network.
We would like to add that, potentially, our methods can be also used for tracking
a target advancing through the area. For instance, by observing a simulation run of a
moving object in the last numerical example, one could see that in spite of occasional false
alarms, the correct intrusion alarms indicate a clear path that can be easily deciphered
from multiple sensor readings.
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